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Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for the frequently observed phenomenon
of “inefficient micromanagement”. I show that a supervisor may get compre-
hensively involved into activities of a subordinate although a better option of
delegation is available. This inefficiency persists in the absence of conflict of
preferences and even as the cost of delegation becomes zero. The paper also
demonstrates that imposing constraints on communication with a subordinate
can be beneficial for a superior.
1. Introduction
Why is it that managers are typically running out of time while their
subordinates are typically running out of work?
“Management Time,” Harvard Business Review,
November-December 1999, p.179
President Carter’s policy to personally review all requests for the White House
tennis court is, perhaps, one of the most notorious examples of inefficient micro-
management.1 Yet, excessive involvement of supervisors in routine activities of their
subordinates is widespread in many areas of life. The business press is full of stories in
which CEOs participate in decisions at the lowest hierarchical levels.2 Management
∗This paper is based on my dissertation, submitted to the Graduate School of the University
of Wisconsin - Madison. I would like to thank my advisor Larry Samuelson for his continuous
encouragement and support. I am also grateful to James Andreoni, Scott Gehlbach, Jing Li, Ming
Li, Bart Lipman, Lucia Quesada, and Bill Sandholm for numerous discussions and suggestions.
Financial support from the project SFB 15, Projektbereich A is gratefully acknowledged.
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1Reported by James Fallows, chief White House speechwriter for President Carter’s first two
years in office, in The Atlantic Monthly; May 1979; Vol. 243, No. 5; pp. 33-48.
2See for example the articles “The Controversial Boss of Beatrice,” Fortune, July 22, 1985, and
“Pressured by KKR, Primedia CEO resigns,” Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2003.
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textbooks and surveys consistently list failure to delegate among the main charac-
teristics of inefficient leadership.3 Williamson [9], p.148, warns that the tendency of
top-level management to engage “in the operating affairs of the divisions in an exten-
sive and continuing way” compromises the optimal allocation of attention between
short-run issues and long-run goals.
Why do managers fail to delegate and get buried in routine? Currently, the
literature offers two explanations. The one argument is that “a desire to be com-
prehensively involved is evidently difficult to resist” (Williamson [9], p.149) and that
“managers need to overcome the psychological desire to be indispensable” (Ghoshal
and Bruch, [4], p.42). The other frequently suggested reason is that a subordinate
cannot be trusted to take the optimal decision: “if I allow [the subordinate] to do
this, how can I be sure that he will do it correctly?” (Walker [8], p.98).
Both of these explanations are problematic. First, do managers actually have
an intrinsic preference for excessive micromanagement or is it an outcome of the
interaction between a superior and a subordinate? Second, if a subordinate cannot
be trusted but is, nevertheless, retained by his superior, then it is not surprising that
the latter will (optimally) make her instructions more detailed.
In this paper, I show that inefficient micromanagement can arise endogenously as
a consequence of a coordination failure between a supervisor and a subordinate; this
result does not require the supervisor to have any intrinsic preference for microman-
agement or the subordinate to be untrustworthy. In my model, the subordinate may
come to rely on the expertise of the supervisor (an inefficient equilibrium), even if a
better option of determining the optimal decision independently (an efficient equilib-
rium) is available. In the inefficient equilibrium, the supervisor fears that, unless she
directs the subordinate, the latter will take an incorrect decision. Therefore, the su-
pervisor has an incentive to babysit the subordinate by making decisions for him. As
a result, the subordinate has no incentive to put any effort into independently com-
ing up with the optimal decision, justifying the concern that he cannot be delegated
decision-making.4
The seemingly straightforward solution for the problem of inefficient microman-
agement is (1) to hire another, more experienced and better skilled, subordinate
and/or (2) to better align interests of the subordinate and the supervisor. Perhaps
surprisingly, this may not help. The inefficient equilibrium will exist even if the par-
ties do not have any conflict of preferences and the cost of coming up with the optimal
decision for the subordinate is zero. This paper characterizes necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of this inefficiency.
The richer is the communication structure between the parties, the more likely
3See the survey on key business issues by the American Management Association, 1999, and
the survey study “Competing in a Global Economy” by the Watson Wyatt, 1994, both of which
list failure to delegate among top four “reasons for executive’s failure” and “barriers to leadership
development” correspondingly; for an early study on reasons for poor management see David Brown,
[1], where failure to delegate and over-involvement were ranked first.
4In contrast, in the efficient equilibrium there is no active role for the supervisor. In reality, how-
ever, the supervisor is needed because not all decision problems can be addressed by the employee.
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is the inefficient equilibrium to appear. Paradoxically, it can be advantageous for a
supervisor to have constraints on the ability to communicate to subordinates. These
constraints prevent the parties from completely resolving uncertainty through com-
munication. Therefore, when the costs of determining the optimal decision by the
subordinate are low (and hence delegation is efficient), he will have an incentive to an-
alyze information and come up with a decision independently; in turn, it will remove
the incentive for the supervisor to intervene in the affairs of the subordinate.
The inefficiency in my model is somewhat similar to what is called “Samaritan’s
dilemma” in parent - child relationships, where the child may come to suboptimally
rely on the help of the parent.5 However, whereas the conflict of interest between
parties is an essential ingredient of the Samaritan’s Dilemma, failure to delegate
occurs (even) in the absence of such a conflict.
As in the Samaritan’s Dilemma, if the supervisor (the parent) can commit to a
specific behavior, the inefficiency disappears. One might also expect that over time
the parties should be able to negotiate and agree to play the efficient equilibrium.
Unfortunately, in reality commitment abilities of a supervisor are often limited, while
renegotiation is costly and takes a long time. Moreover, the parties often have at
least some conflict of interests. Although in that case the qualitative structure of
equilibria would be the same, the difference in preferences would make it very difficult
to coordinate on the (“efficient”) equilibrium preferred by the supervisor.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an example.
Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 presents the main result. Section 5 discusses
how the inefficient equilibrium can be destroyed by constraining the supervisor’s abil-
ity to communicate. Section 6 concludes.
2. Example
This section presents an example to illustrate the reasons for inefficient micromanage-
ment. I will consider a simplified version of the model, where the only costs incurred
by the supervisor stem from communication with the subordinate. (In the general
model, the supervisor also has a cost of coming up with the optimal decision.) It is
also assumed there are no technological constraints on communication. The result
that communication constraints can be beneficial for both parties is postponed until
the formal analysis.
There is a supervisor (she) and a subordinate (he). The subordinate’s job is to
implement product modifications. There are two equally likely states of the world.
In the one state (ω = yes) the innovation should be introduced, while in the other
(ω = no) it should not. In the first period, the supervisor observes the state and
decides whether to meet with the subordinate, i.e., whether to send him a message,
(M) or not (NM). The cost of the meeting is cm > 0.
6 The subordinate, in the
5I thank James Andreoni for pointing out this connection. See Buchanan [3] and Bruce and
Waldman [2] for more details.
6The results in this paper can be easily extended to the case of message-dependent communication
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second period, observes whether the meeting has occurred and decides whether to
pay a cost of cl ≥ 0 and learn (L) the state. After that, the subordinate chooses
whether to introduce an innovation (q = yes) or not (q = no). The payoffs of the
supervisor and the subordinate are the same. If the subordinate makes a decision that
matches the state of the world then the payoffs are equal to one minus potentially
incurred costs of communication and learning. Otherwise, the payoffs are zero minus
the costs. I will use the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium solution concept. The extensive
form of this game is presented in Figure 1.
ω = noω = yes N
M M
sb
L L
yes
1− cm
no
−cm
yes
−cm
no
1− cm
yes
1− cm − cl
sb
no
−cm − cl
yes
−cm − cl
sb
no
1− cm − cl
NM
SP
NM
SP
sb
L L
yes
1
no
0
yes
0
no
1
yes
1− cl
sb
no
−cl
yes
−cl
sb
no
1− cl
Figure 1. Example. Notation: N stands for Nature, SP for the supervisor, sb for the subordinate,
ω = no for no innovation, ω = yes for innovation, M for communicating (meeting), NM for not
communicating, L for learning the state, yes for introducing innovation, and no for not introducing
the innovation; cm is the cost meeting, cl is the cost of learning the state, 1 is the profit if the action
matches the state, 0 is the profit otherwise.
For cm > 0 and cl ≤ 1/2, there is an equilibrium in which the supervisor never
costs, i.e., situations in which the cost of the meeting is determined by the content and duration of
the meeting.
4
sends any message and the subordinate always pays cl, learns the state of the world,
and takes the correct action; in this equilibrium the payoff is 1 − cl. Because there
are no meetings on the equilibrium path, the subordinate holds the prior beliefs that
both states are equally likely. Hence, his behavior is optimal because the expected
payoff from learning and taking the correct action, 1 − cl, exceeds the payoff from
making the uninformed decision, 1/2. The optimality of the supervisor’s behavior
can be supported by multiple off-equilibrium beliefs. One possibility is that off the
equilibrium path the subordinate has the prior beliefs. In this case, it is a best
response for the subordinate to mix with equal probability between both actions.
(These out-of-equilibrium beliefs and behavior support the equilibrium in which the
supervisor sends no message for the largest set of cost parameters.) It follows that
the behavior of the supervisor is optimal because the payoff from sending no message,
1− cl, exceeds the payoff from sending a message, 1/2− cm.
At the same time, for 0 ≤ cm ≤ 1 and cl ≥ 0 there exists another equilibrium
in which the supervisor initiates a meeting in (only) one of the states. This allows
the subordinate to infer the state and to choose the correct action without paying
cl. In order to see this, let the supervisor communicate whenever the innovation
is needed.7 Then, in the second period, the subordinate believes that ω = yes if
he was contacted by the supervisor and ω = no otherwise. As a result, he chooses
to introduce an innovation only after the meeting. Next, the supervisor’s behavior
is optimal: If ω = no she achieves the highest possible payoff by doing nothing.
However, if the state is ω = yes the supervisor chooses to meet with the subordinate
to prevent him from making the incorrect decision.
The payoff in this equilibrium is equal to 1− cm/2 and does not depend on cl.
8 It
follows immediately that this equilibrium is inefficient for cl < cm/2. Notice that it
exists even if the costs of learning for the subordinate are zero.
3. Model
There is a supervisor (she) and a subordinate (he). The common prior beliefs about
the state of the world ω are represented by a probability measure µ(·) which has
support on Ω ⊆ R.
Timing, actions, and costs. In the first period, the supervisor decides whether to
pay a cost cL ≥ 0 and learn ω (L) or not (NL). That is, the costs incurred in the
first period from learning are
CL(x) =
{
cL, x = L;
0, x = NL.
7Of course, there is also an equilibrium in which the supervisor communicates whenever the
innovation is not needed.
8In this game, as long as cm 6= cl, these are the only two equilibria. Otherwise, there might exist
equilibria in mixed strategies, in which the supervisor randomizes between communicating to the
subordinate and not.
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After that, the supervisor can pay a cost cM ≥ 0 and send a message m ∈ M
to the subordinate. I will denote sending no message as sending an empty message
m = φ. Therefore, the cost of sending a message can be represented as
Cm(m) =
{
cM , m ∈M ;
0, m = φ.
In the second period, the subordinate observes the message (or no message) sent by
the supervisor. After updating his beliefs about ω, the subordinate decides whether
to pay a cost cl ≥ 0 and learn the state of the world (l) or not (nl). The costs incurred
in the second period are
Cl(y) =
{
cl, y = l;
0, y = nl.
Finally, the subordinate chooses an action (a decision) d ∈ D ⊆ R.
Payoffs. The supervisor and the subordinate have the same payoffs that are
represented by the difference of the utility from the taken action, a continuous function
v(d, ω), and all incurred costs:
u = v(d, ω)− Cm(m)− CL(x)− Cl(y).
I assume that for every ω there is a unique action that maximizes v(·, ω) and that
it is different and unique for every ω:
argmax
d
v(d, ω) = {dω},
and for any ω
′
and ω
′′
, ω
′
6= ω
′′
,
dω′ 6= dω′′ .
It is also assumed that the action that maximizes the expected payoff given prior
beliefs is unique
argmax
d
∫
Ω
v(d, ω)dµ = {d}.
Remark. In this setting, a message sent by the supervisor can be viewed as a
recommendation of an action. Therefore, card(M) may be interpreted as the cardi-
nality of the set of actions that can be induced by communication. The assumption
that the action that maximizes v(d, ω) is unique and different for every ω implies
that the cardinality of the set of possibly optimal decisions equals to card(Ω). If
card(M) < card(Ω), the set of actions that can result from communication alone is
strictly contained in the set of potentially optimal actions. At this point, I do not
impose any restrictions on the cardinality of M : I will study communication struc-
tures that are capable of resolving all uncertainty, e.g., M = Ω, as well as that are
not capable of it, i.e., M for which card(M) < card(Ω).
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Solution concept. The appropriate solution concept for this game is the Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (certain care should be taken in defining Bayesian beliefs since
for some µ(·) all states can occur with probability zero).
Fully informative equilibria. There may be multiple equilibria that differ in the
amount of transferred information. The equilibria in which the supervisor learns the
state and sends messages to the subordinate in the manner that allows the latter to
infer the state are particularly interesting for our purposes. I call such equilibria fully
informative.
Efficiency. The efficient equilibrium is the equilibrium that yields the parties
the highest ex-ante expected payoff among all equilibria, U•(cL, cm, cl). Similarly,
the most inefficient equilibrium is an equilibrium with the lowest ex-ante payoff,
U•(cL, cm, cl).
4. Inefficient Allocation of Decision Making
In this section, I study the case in which M = Ω, i.e, the message space is rich
enough to always convey the value of the realized state to the subordinate and thus
communication is capable of inducing the optimal action in every state. One might
expect that as the cost of learning by the subordinate goes to zero, so should the
losses even in the most inefficient equilibrium. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily
true: the inefficiency losses might not disappear even if the subordinate can learn the
state at no cost. Below, I characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions on the
preferences and the information structure such that the payoff in the most inefficient
equilibrium does not improve as the cost of learning for the subordinate cl converges
to zero.
In my model, there can be an equilibrium, in which the supervisor never learns the
state of the world and never sends any messages, while the subordinate pays cl, learns
the state of the world ω, and chooses the optimal decision dω. It is easy to demonstrate
that for any fixed cm > 0, cL > 0, and small costs cl this equilibrium exists: Because
there is no communication and cl is small, it is optimal for the subordinate to learn
the state and make an informed decision. On the other hand, the supervisor knows
that the subordinate is going to learn the state of the world and therefore she has no
incentive to pay an extra cost of learning the state and sending a message.
This equilibrium is efficient for small enough cl. In any other equilibrium (if it
exists) the supervisor learns the information and/or sends messages at least for some
ω. After each such message the subordinate does not pay cl and does not learn the
state of the world (otherwise, sending a message cannot be optimal). Thus, there is
a tradeoff between the cost of learning and sending the messages by the supervisor
and the cost of learning by the subordinate. If cl is small, learning information by
the subordinate and doing nothing by the supervisor is efficient. Hence,
Lemma 1 For any cm > 0 and cL > 0 there exists c
′
such that for all cl ≤ c
′
there
is an efficient equilibrium in which the supervisor does not learn the state and does
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not send any messages, while the subordinate learns the state and takes the optimal
action.
Proof Denote a pure strategy of the supervisor by a triple (x,mNL, mL), where
x ∈ {L,NL} is the decision whether to learn the state of the world, mNL ∈ M is
the message in the absence of learning, and mL : Ω → M is the message sent after
learning the state of the world.
Next, denote the strategy of the subordinate by a triple (y, dm, dl), where (1)
y : M → {l, nl} is the decision about whether to learn the state (which depends on
the received message), (2) dm : M → D is the action taken when the subordinate
does not learn the state and updates his beliefs based solely on the received message,
and (3) dl : Ω→ D is the action taken after the subordinate learns the state (strictly
speaking, dl should be defined on M × Ω but because ω is known at the point of the
decision, d is independent of m sent).
In addition, let µm(·) be the beliefs of the subordinate about the state after ob-
serving message m. I will not talk explicitly about beliefs at all other nodes in the
game, because these are always either the prior beliefs (before learning the state) or
beliefs that have a mass point on the true state of the world (after learning the state).
Consider the triple of the supervisor’s strategy (NL, φ, φ), the subordinate’s strat-
egy (l, d, dω), and the subordinate’s beliefs µm(·) = µ(·). If cl is small enough, this is
an equilibrium.
The beliefs are Bayesian. On the equilibrium path, the supervisor always sends
the same message φ (no communication) and therefore there is no new information
for the subordinate. Off the equilibrium path, beliefs can be arbitrary.
The strategy of the supervisor is the best response. Given that the subordinate
will hold the prior beliefs even after communicating with the supervisor, messages do
not have any effect. The supervisor then optimally chooses the least costly alternative
to send no message, φ.
The strategy of the subordinate is the best response for small enough cl. By
definition of dω and d they are optimal actions given correspondingly the knowledge
of the state and the prior beliefs. It follows that learning the state gives a payoff
of
∫
Ω
v(dω, ω)dµ − cl + C, while not learning
∫
Ω
v(d, ω)dµ + C for some constant
C representing the remainder of the payoff. Learning is optimal when cl ≤ c1 =∫
Ω
v(dω, ω)− v(d, ω)dµ, where c1 > 0 by the assumption that dω is different for each
ω.
This equilibrium is efficient for small enough cl. To see this, imagine that some
other equilibrium exists. Then, it must be that on the equilibrium path the super-
visor with strictly positive probability p > 0 sends some messages different from φ.
Furthermore, these messages must affect the final decisions taken, otherwise the su-
pervisor would have not incurred the cost of sending the message. In order to have
any effect, these messages must be sent after the supervisor learns the state of the
world. For any such message m
′
, let dm′ be the taken action. The realized payoff
after m
′
is u(m
′
) = v(dm′ , ω)−cL−cm−Cl(y) ≤ v(dω, ω)−cL−cm. Correspondingly,
if the message is not sent, the payoff can be bounded by v(dω, ω) − cL. It follows
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that the total payoff in this equilibrium must be weakly less than v(dω, ω)− cL−pcm.
Comparing it with the payoff in the original equilibrium, v(dω, ω)−cl, we obtain that
the latter is higher if cl ≤ pcm + cL.
To finish the proof set c
′
= min{c1, cL}.

Let us now turn to inefficient equilibria. Assume that the supervisor learns the
state of the world and sends the messages in a manner that allows the subordinate
to always infer the realized state. In this case, for any cost cl ≥ 0, the subordinate
cannot gain anything from learning the state. Therefore, it is a best response for him
to never learn the state and take the optimal action given the beliefs about ω updated
using the message. Whether this behavior of the subordinate makes it optimal for the
supervisor to communicate in the way that resolves all uncertainty for the subordinate
depends on the structure of preferences.
One way for communication to be fully informative is for the supervisor to send no
message in one state, say ω1, and to send a different message for each of the remaining
states in Ω\ω1.
9 It is only necessary to guarantee that after a realization in Ω\ω1
the supervisor does not want to deviate to sending no message or sending a different
message. (There is no profitable deviation after ω1 since the subordinate takes dω1
and no communication cost is paid.) In this case, (ignoring the sunk costs) the
conditional payoff from sending a message is v(dω, ω)− cm and the conditional payoff
from sending no message is v(dω1, ω). There is no profitable deviation if and only if
v(dω, ω)−v(dω1, ω) ≥ cm for all ω ∈ Ω\ω1. (The rest of possible deviations are to send
some other - possibly not used - messages. They are easy to deal with by assigning
a belief ω = ω1 to all out-of-equilibrium messages.) Formally, for every ω ∈ Ω define
c(ω) = inf
ω
′
∈Ω\ω
(
v(dω′ , ω
′
)− v(dω, ω
′
)
)
. It follows that there is an equilibrium with
fully informative communication if and only if C = sup
ω∈Ω
c(ω) is strictly greater than
zero.
Remark. Clearly, as the example in Section 2 shows, there are situations in which
C > 0. However, if the range of v(Ω) = {v ∈ R|v = v(dω, ω), ω ∈ Ω} is an interval,
C = 0.10
Lemma 2 There exists c
′
m and c
′
L such that for any 0 < cm ≤ c
′
m, cL ≤ c
′
L, and any
cl ≥ 0, there exists an equilibrium with fully informative communication if and only
if C > 0. The payoff in this equilibrium is independent of cl.
Proof Sufficiency. Assume C > 0. Then, it is possible to find ω0 ∈ Ω such that
c(ω0) = inf
ω∈Ω\ω0
(v(dω, ω)− v(dω0, ω)) > 0.
9There is another possibility in which the supervisor sends messages in all states of the world.
However, if this behavior is a part of equilibrium then this equilibrium must be efficient.
10Even in this case, the equilibrium with fully informative communication may be possible if the
cost of communication, cm, is message-dependent.
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Let the supervisor’s strategy be (L, φ,mL), where mL(ω0) = φ and for any two
different ω1 and ω2, mL(ω1) 6= mL(ω2). (It is always possible to find such ml if
card(M) = card(Ω).) This strategy allows to define the inverse function m−1L :
M → Ω to mL(·). Next, let the subordinate’s strategy be (nl, dm−1
L
(m), dω), where
m−1L (m) is extended to m
−1
L (m) = ω0 for m off the equilibrium path. Finally, let
the subordinate’s beliefs put probability one to m−1L (m) on the equilibrium path and
probability one to ω
′
for the messages out of the equilibrium path.
These strategies and beliefs are an equilibrium if cm ≤ c(ω0). Clearly, the beliefs
of the subordinate are Bayesian on the equilibrium path and his strategy is a best re-
sponse given his beliefs. Thus, we only need to show the optimality of the supervisor’s
behavior.
After realization ω0, the supervisor sends no message φ, the subordinate correctly
infers the state of the world, and the continuation payoff is v(dω0, ω0)−cL−cm, which
cannot be improved upon by any deviation.
After any other realization ω, the supervisor obtains the continuation payoff of
v(dω, ω)−cL−cm and has three types of deviations. He can choose to send a different
message m
′
6= mL(ω) that is observed on the equilibrium path. This will give the
payoff v(dm−1
L
(m
′
), ω) − cL − cm, which is strictly worse. Second, he can deviate to
sending a message that does not occur on the equilibrium path. The subordinate will
believe that the state is ω0, which will also give a strictly lower payoff of v(dω0, ω)−
cL − cm. Finally, the supervisor can deviate to sending no message, φ. This will give
the payoff of v(dω0, ω)−cL, which is strictly lower then the equilibrium payoff because
cm ≤ c(ω0) ≤ v(dω, ω)− v(dω0, ω).
Last, we need to demonstrate that it is optimal for the supervisor to learn the
state of the world. The equilibrium payoff is
∫
Ω
v(dω, ω)dµ − cL − (1 − µ(ω0))cm.
If the supervisor does not learn the state of the world, then the best he can do
is to send either no message (leading to the decision of dω0) or the message (that
occurs on the equilibrium path and leads to, say, decision dω′ ) that will maximize
the payoff given the prior beliefs. Thus, the payoff from the best deviation is u =
max{
∫
Ω
v(dω0, ω)dµ,
∫
Ω
v(dω′ , ω)dµ} − cm}. The deviation is not profitable if cL ≤
cL =
∫
Ω
v(dω, ω)dµ− (1−µ(ω0))cm−u. Finally, to guarantee that cL > 0 it is enough
to notice that
cm ≤ cm =
∫
Ω
(v(dω, ω)− v(dω0, ω))dµ
1− µ(ω0)
This condition is satisfied since
cm ≤ c(ω0) ≤ v(dω, ω)− v(dω0, ω) ≤
v(dω, ω)− v(dω0, ω)
1− µ(ω0)
= cm
Necessity. Assume that C = 0. I am going to show that there is no fully infor-
mative equilibrium. Potentially, there can exist only two types of fully informative
equilibrium. In both of them, the supervisor always learns the state of the world.
In the equilibrium of the first type, the supervisor sends a distinct message in
every state of the world, with the exception with some state ω0, in which he sends no
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message φ. This empty message φ leads to a action dω0. If C = 0, then regardless of
the exact values of ω0 and cm it is possible to find ω such that v(dω, ω)−cm < v(dω0, ω).
But then the supervisor would deviate to sending no message when the state is ω.
In the equilibrium of the second type, the supervisor sends a distinct non-empty
message in every state of the world. There are two possibilities. First, in the case of
observing the out-of-equilibrium message φ the subordinate may choose not to learn
the state of the world and take some action dφ, which is optimal given his out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. In this case, in order for the supervisor not to deviate to sending
φ, it should be that v(dω, ω)− cm ≥ v(dφ, ω) for all ω. But there should exist at least
some ω
′
for which v(dφ, ω
′
) ≥ v(dω0, ω
′
); otherwise dφ cannot be the best response to
φ for any beliefs. Taken together, v(dω′ , ω
′
)− cm ≥ v(dω0, ω
′
) contradicts C = 0.
The second possibility is that after observing the out-of-equilibrium message φ the
subordinate learns the state. Then there will exist c˜lcm such that for all cl < c˜l the
payoff on the equilibrium path v(dω, ω)− cm will be strictly less than the payoff from
deviation to φ, v(dω, ω)− cl, and thus the supervisor will find it optimal to deviate.

One may notice that if the cost of learning the state by the subordinate is small,
the only equilibria that can exist are those established in Lemmas 1 and 2: it is either
that there is no communication and the subordinate learns the state independently
or that communication between the parties is fully informative and the subordinate
never learns the state. The only other possibility is to have an equilibrium in which the
supervisor learns the state but communication takes such form that the subordinate
(at least sometimes) is not completely convinced about the value of the realized state
of the world. But, then, for small enough cl there are strictly positive gains from
learning the state by the subordinate. In turn, if the subordinate is going to learn
the state of the world, then the supervisor is better off sending no message to save
on communication costs. Thus,
Lemma 3 There is c
′′
such that for any cl < c
′′
there exist at most two types of
equilibria: with fully informative communication and without communication. Both
equilibria exist simultaneously if and only if c∅ > 0. Otherwise, the only existing
equilibrium is without communication.
Proof The strategy of the supervisor in the equilibrium with fully informative com-
munication is (L,mNL, mL), where mNL is arbitrary and mL(·) is such that for any
two different ω1 and ω2, mL(ω1) 6= mL(ω2). In the equilibrium without communica-
tion the supervisor’s strategy is (NL, φ,mL) where mL is arbitrary.
The only other candidates for the equilibrium are (1) (L,mNL, mL) where mL does
not always produce distinct messages for different states, (2) (NL,mNL, mL) where
mNL 6= φ, and (3) a strategy in which the supervisor mixes between learning and not
learning the state of the world.
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In the first case, there should be a message m after which the subordinate’s beliefs
µm are imprecise and for any decision d
′
,
∫
Ω
v(dω, ω)dµm >
∫
Ω
v(d
′
, ω)dµm. Therefore,
for small cl the subordinate will learn the state of the world. But if this is the
equilibrium strategy, then the supervisor is better off sending no message φ, which
implies that φ is the only message after which the beliefs are imprecise. Then, for
every message on the equilibrium path (for small enough cl) the supervisor will find
it optimal to deviate to φ, which will trigger learning by the subordinate.
The strategy in the second case cannot be a part of an equilibrium because oth-
erwise the supervisor would be better off deviating to always sending no message,
φ.
The argument for the case of a mixed learning strategy is completely analogous
to the first case.

Now I present the main result that the inefficiency loss need not disappear as
the cost of learning information for the subordinate goes to zero. Lemma 1 says
that for small costs of learning cl, in the efficient equilibrium the supervisor does
not learn the state of the world and does not communicate with the subordinate,
while the subordinate learns the state of the world independently. The payoff in this
equilibrium converges to the payoff which would be achieved in the world of perfect
information as the cost cl converges to zero because the only losses in this equilibrium
are due to learning and paying cl. On the other hand, Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that
(if and only if c∅ > 0) there are inefficient equilibria whose payoffs are independent
of cl. Therefore,
Proposition 1 If and only if C > 0, there exists c∗(cL, cm) > 0 such that for any
cl < c
∗ the difference of the payoffs in the efficient and the most inefficient equilib-
ria U•(cL, cm, cl) − U•(cL, cm, cl) is strictly greater than zero (and is increasing as cl
becomes smaller). Otherwise, U•(cL, cm, cl)− U•(cL, cm, cl) = 0.
Proof If C = 0, Lemma 3 implies that for small cl there is a unique equilibrium. If
C > 0, Lemma 3 implies that there are only two equilibria, a fully informative equilib-
rium and an equilibrium without communication. The payoff in the fully informative
equilibrium is equal to
∫
Ω
v(dω, ω)dµ− cL − (1− µ(ω0))cm where ω0 is some state in
Ω and is independent of cl. The payoff in the equilibrium without communication is
(for small cl) equal to
∫
Ω
v(dω, ω)dµ− cl. The direct comparison of the payoffs gives
the result in the proposition.

5. Constrained Communication
In this section I assume that C > 0 and analyze how imposing constraints on commu-
nication can destroy inefficient equilibrium. The result in Proposition 1 that even as
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the learning costs cl become arbitrarily small the possible inefficiency losses do not
vanish is obtained under the assumption thatM = Ω and thus there exist (inefficient)
equilibria in which the messages of the supervisor resolve all uncertainty for the sub-
ordinate. Here I show that if the dimensionality of the message space M is smaller
than the dimensionality of the space Ω then the inefficiencies must disappear as cl
becomes small. The intuition for this result is straightforward. When the message
space is not rich enough, the set of actions that can be induced by the communication
is strictly contained in the set of potentially optimal actions. Then, for small enough
cl there are strictly positive gains from learning the state by the subordinate. We
have the following
Proposition 2 If C > 0 then there exists c∗∗ such that for any cl < c
∗∗ the equi-
librium is unique if and only if card(M) < card(Ω). In this equilibrium there is no
communication.
Proof The results in Lemmas 1 and 3 are proven without relying on the assumption
about cardinality of M and Ω. In contrast, Lemma 2 requires that card(M) ≥
card(Ω). Thus, we only need to show that when this is not the case there cannot
exist a fully informative equilibrium.
If card(M) < card(Ω), it is impossible to construct a function that assigns a
distinct message to every state of the world. In this case, in any equilibrium there
will be a message m after which the subordinate beliefs µm are imprecise and for any
decision d
′
,
∫
Ω
v(dω, ω)dµm >
∫
Ω
v(d
′
, ω)dµm. Therefore, for small cl the subordinate
will learn the state of the world. Hence, a fully informative equilibrium cannot exist.

A noisy communication device is another means of destroying the inefficient equi-
librium. Assume that if the supervisor sends a message m then the subordinate re-
ceives the original message m with probability 1− p and a different message m
′
∈M
with probability p (m
′
can be random).
In this scenario, after observing the message the subordinate cannot be completely
convinced about the state of the world. If p is sufficiently high or cl is sufficiently
low then the subordinate will always learn the state and the equilibrium in which it
completely relies on the messages would not exist. Hence,
Proposition 3 In the game where the messages are distorted with probability p and
C > 0 there exists c˜ such that for any cl < c˜ the equilibrium is unique. In this
equilibrium there is no communication.
Proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2 and therefore is skipped.

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6. Conclusions
In this paper I study possible reasons for inefficiency in information processing in
organizations and institutions. In particular, I am interested in explaining the appar-
ently suboptimal decision practices where a supervisor micromanages the behavior
of an employee. I show that even in the absence of conflict of preferences, the sub-
ordinate may rely on the information provided by the supervisor, although it would
be more efficient to collect information independently. The fact that the supervisor
is expected to come up with the optimal decisions crowds out the initiative of the
subordinate. In turn, this creates incentives for the supervisor to collect and process
information even if it is very costly.
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